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REPLY TO HEELAS 
F. Allan Hanson 
First let me counter a few statements in Heelas' critique. He lists as one 
of my points "that understanding a philosphy in its own terms' presupposes an 
intimate knowledge of their language and culture. Since his, own analysis was 
made without such a knowledge, Hanson suggests that their ~own terms need not be 
well known". But this is by no means my suggestion. It is rather that since I 
lack intimate first-hand acquaintance with African cultures, the analysiS I 
offered cannot be expected to reveal African thought in its own terms. As for 
his question of how my theory is to be verified or falsified, see the ninth 
paragraph of Part, II and the paper t slast paragraph. 
Reela,s also bbje~ts' to the logic.of,the'paper, apparently thinking that I 
do such confusing' or contradictory things as both adopting and' re jectingWinch, 
and urging understand.?-ng of anothe'r philosophy only in its own termS and, also 
only in our terms. I agree that my use of the word "only" was o~casiopally 
lax, and I regret any obscurity this may have caused. I suggest·, however, 
that what Heelas takes as logical confusion or contradiction is really the 
progression of argument. In Part I some advantages which would a~crue from 
understanding another philosophy in its own terms were mentioned, 'and I offered 
what might appear to be this kind of analysis of an aspect of Afriqan thought. 
Part II asked Whether the analysis of Part I really dpes provide understanding 
of African thought in its own terms, and a series of arguments were offered that 
it does not. Extending this ,one conclusion of the paper was that we cannot 
expect to understand alien modes of thought in their own terms. Therefore 
the reasoning of the paper ended with the unequivocal assertions that we 
understand alien modes of thought in our terms, and that Winch (who in the 
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Probably-· Hee1.as. main objection is that- my paper misrepresents the 
position of lUnch. I agree' with Healas on this point, am grateful to 
him for pointing out. my error and glad for this ~pportunit,y to recant. 
I now agree with Heelas that Winch would have us "extend our 'own' "18.Y 
of looking at things ll , or IIdevelop a meta-level of organis&.tional 
devices which are of UDiversal applicabilityll rather than understand 
native thought in its own terms. Hore will be said of l-linch,as I now 
tmderstand him, in a moDiant. 
By now the isstias at' stake in all this must be badly obscured, and 
certainly I have added to the confUsion through my misrepresentation of 
Winch. I tbink these issues, are important, so in the hope of 
c1arif"ying them I shall attempt to set out the essence of what I 
currently understand this whole discussion to be about. 
It all begins with a train of thought which I ~ here abstracting 
from Nielsen, and which he says derives ultimately' from Wittgenstein 
and/or his disciples (Nielsen 1967:192-193). For present purposes the 
following points are enough: the meaning of wOl-ds is fotmd in their 
usage in a given mode of discourse (religious mods of discourse, 
scientific mode of discourse~: etc.). A mode of discourse contains its 
own concepts of reality, rationality and intelligibility. One should 
therefore tmderstand tho meaning of a word in terms of the concepts of 
rationality, reality and intelligibility of the mode of discourse in 
\~bich that word is used, ~ according to sucb concepts drawn from some 
other mode of discourse. Finally, we must be contant simply with 
identifying the ooncepts of rationalit,y, reality and intelligibilit,y of. 
a mode of discourse. Since there simply are no other, nhigher-order ll 
concepts against which these ooncepts can be assessed, here the process 
of understanding in terms of something' else must cease. 
Now, assume that the words and their meanings which we wish to 
understand belong to a mode of discourse in a language and culture other 
than our own. Tile .reasoning summarized above might be t8kel1to.direct 
us to identify the concepts of rationality,reality and intelligibility 
intrinsic to that· alien mode of discourse and to understand the words 
and meanings in question in terms of those concepts. I take this to 
mean understanding the alien mode of discoursoin its own terms. The 
argument in Part II of my paper was that "tIe do not and probably cannot 
achieve that.. kiner oftmderstanding.· I still assert ~hat argument. 
But that argument does not refute Winch, for he does not ask that 
we tmde·rstand an alien mode of: discourse· in its own terms.' Let me try 
to explain \-linch's position as I now understand it. Consider again the 
last point of the ''\-Iittgansteinianll reasoning summarized above"';' that 
there are no IIhigber-order ll concepts in terms of which the concepts of 
realit,y, rationality and intelligibility of a given mode of discourse 
can be assessed. This may be taken to imply tbat each mode of 
discourse is hermetioally sealed, that there is noway of relating one 
mode of discourse to another. 'Nie1sen calls this the 
IIcompartmentalization thesis" and he, attributes it to Whch (Nialsen' 
1967:201, 2CJ7). Mistakenly, I think, for W:tnch writes (approvingly): 
Mr. Rush Rhees points out that to try to account tor the .. 
meaningf'u1ness of language solely' in terms of'isolated 
language games is to omit the important fact· tbat wqs of 
. speaking are not insulated from each other in mutually
 
exclusive systems of rules. Uhat can be said: in one
 
" context by tile ~ use of a certain expression depends for
 
.its sense on the uses of that expression in other
 
contexts (different language games) (Uinch 1964:321).
 
So \-linch clearlyracognises that meanings in different modes' of 
.discoursa can be related. And tllis holds even wbenthe modes ·of 
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of understanding we seek requires that we see the Zande category in
 
relation to our own already understood categories" (lUnch 1964:319).
 
But this relation is not to be achieved simply by fitting our
 
categories into theirs, nor theirs into ours.
 
vIe are not seeld.ng a state in which things will appear to us 
just as they do to members of S another society , and 
perhaps such a state is unattainable anyway. But we E:! 
seeking a way of looking at things which goe s beyond our 
previous way in that it has in some way taken account of and 
incorporated the other way that members of S have of loold.ng 
at things. Seriously to studiY' another way of life is 
necessarily to extend our 'own-not simply to bring the other 
way within the already eXisting boundaries of our own, 
because the point about the latter in their present form, fs 
that they ex hypothesi exclude tha.t other (Hinch 1964:317­
318, see also vlinch 1958:89-90). 
So .t·~cN1mderstand Winch to argue that ,.e should understand another 
systemof·thought in terms of a ~ mode of discourse or "way of looking 
at things", an extension of ours which in-cQqlcrates native concepts of 
rationali ty ,realj.ty and' intelligibility as wel+ as our own. 
I am.in far greater agreement with this position than with that ~ 
thought vrinch held when I \.roto my paper. However, I think his. IInew ll 
position (new to me 1) requires certain qualifications.' It ~Ji1l be seen 
that these stem from the same line of thinking as I worked out in 
Part II of my paper. 
Presumably the new, extended mode of discourse we construct for 
understanding another culture, like any mode of discourse, has its own 
concepts of reality, rationality and intelligibility. Consider just 
its concept of intelligibility. Is this simply a given? Are there no 
other concepts of intelligibility against which we can .assess it, 
rendering it impossible for us to c:Diticize the way in which the 
extended mode of discourse makes another culture intelligible? I do not 
Imow how Hinch would answer this. l But 'olhen Winch tries to make Zande 
magical rites intelligible by relating them to "a sense of the 
significance of human life ll (1964:320-321), or when I try to make them 
(and certain other aspects of African thought and·~b6tuer.t.DU:') 
intelligible in tarms of two metaphysical postulates, we shall propably 
want to reserve the right of criticism. Therefore, whether or not 
Winch would think we legitimately can criticize the intelligibility of a 
mode of discourse advanced for understanding another culture, it seems 
clear that we constantly S2. make such criticisms.· . And I think we make 
them legitimately. 
When we encounter alternative "ways of loo~gat things" or modes 
of discourse which provide different ways of making the same elements of 
lang~ge usage and patterned behavior intelligible, we often compare 
them ;critically to determine which way of making these .things. 
iJitelligible is preferable. He: could ·notdo ·this .if' eaqh niode 'of 
discourse had its own primitive, unassailable concept of intelligibility, 
for there would be no external' criteria in: terms of which to make a 
judgment of preferability. BUt there obviously are such external 
criteria 'and we do make use of them. One criterion is parsimony: 
which of the alternative modes of discourse makes the phenomena in 
question intelligible in the simplest and most economical way? 
Furthermore, to repeat a point made in my paper, since it is we who make 
judgments between different 'Jays -of looking at the' same things, I 
submit that we do it in terms of ~ own concepts of what constitutes 
proper understanding or intelligibility, for example, in terms of a 
logically realistic epistemology. I do not !mow how much .of this 
vlinch "tol>u1d accept,' but I want to be clear on my own position. It is 






































discourse which we advance for understanding another culture are not 
simply II given II and beyond criticism-. They araultiinately subject to 
~~ concepts of intelligibilit,r. 
I continue to disagree wi tn Winch that understanding in social 
science is radically different from understanding in natural science. 
My argument remains as set out in my paper, so Iiere I shall just 
rephrase one part of it. For Hinch, in natural science a theory 
Ilestablishes u connections between events: ."It is only in ~ of the 
theory that one can speak of the events being thus I connected I ras ' 
opposed to a simple spatio-temporal connection) ; the only way to' 
grasp the connection is to learn the theoryll (Hinch 1958:134, Hinch's 
emphasis). Social phenomena, on the other hand, are related 
internally. "Social relations fall into the same logical category as 
do relations betwoen ideas", and "each system of ideas, its component 
elements baing interrelated internally, has to be understood in and for 
itself" (Hinch 1958:133). Sociological laws may be useful for 
bringing out features which might otnerwise have baen ovarlooked, but 
the nature oftha relations between the phenomena in question is in the 
phenomena themselves, not in the la'lr' or theory (Hinch 1958:135-136). 
Hinch says that we should ,understand other cultures in terms of an 
extended mode of discourse or we:y of looking at things. As I have said 
above, alternative ways of looldng at the same things can be advanced. 
Om of the differences between such alternative ways is that they may 
lead, us to see different kinds of connections be tween the things in 
question. (Consider the various ways of looking at totemism, or at the 
relation between Protestantism and capitalism.) Therefore it seems 
claar that too connections we see between social phenomena are not 
necessarily intrinsic to the phenomena themselves. As in natural 
science, at least some of those connections are functions of our 
theories or ways of looking at things. 
To sum up, I agree with \linch that we should understand another 
culture in terms of an extended mode of discourse or way of looking at 
things.' But I think that such a mode of discourse is ultimately 
subject to concepts of intelligibility which derive £rom our'own . 
culture, and that this way of understanding is not fundamentally 
different from that of natural scienc!3., . 
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1. . One might think he would rep~ affirmatively, on too basis of 
·passages like lithe notion of intelligibility is systematical~ ambiguous 
(in Professor Byle's sense of the phrase) in its use in tllose contexts: 
that is, its sense varies systematically accordin~ to the particular 
context in which it is being used" (ltlincb 1958:18) and IIcriteria of 
logic ••• are only intelligible in the context ot ways of living or modes 
of social life. It follows that one cannot apply criteria of logic to 
inodes of social life as sucb. For instance, science is one such mode 
and religion is another; and each has criteria of intelligibility 
peculiar to itself" (\lIinch 1958:100). On the other band, one migllt 
imagine him rep~ negati ve~ if pna reasons from a statement already 
quoted: IIwbat can be said in one context by the use of a certain 
expression depends for its sense on tile use of tbat exPression in other 
contexts (different language games)" (t-linch 1964:321). .' 
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